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l[]ST PR~lJflLY~~ THE 
by Miriam Lapp Azrael 
Computer Matching Programs Are Turning 
Uncle Sam Into Big Brother 
IS-The Law Forum/Spring, I984 
W hen computer matching pro-grams made headlines in 1981, I privacy experts were shocked 
that government agencies were swapping 
personal data from separate computer 
files for unrelated purposes and were 
outraged to learn that the practice was 
considered "routine."2 
In 1982, a Senate subcommittee held 
hearings to investigate computer match-
ing.3 The following June, a House 
subcommittee also inquired into the 
practice.4 The House subcommittee's 
final report, issued in November, 1983, 
strongly criticized the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) for its lax 
oversight of computer matching pro-
grams and recommended strengthening 
the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act)5 to 
shore up eroding privacy protections.6 
Representative Glenn English (D. Okla.), 
Chairman of the House subcommittee 
that issued the report, introduced H.R. 
3743,7 which calls for the establishment 
of an independent, non-partisan agency 
to implement and enforce compliance 
with the Privacy Act and to develop and 
coordinate privacy protection policies. 
This bill is still in committee. 8 
Preserving the privacy of personal 
information in the computer age is a 
vexing problem that deserves immediate 
attention. This article analyzes the 
impact of computer matching programs 
on protected rights of privacy and 
recommends specific legislative solu-
tions to limit privacy intrusions. 
Overview 
Before computers, information was 
burdensome to record, quickly forgot-
ten and usually inaccessible. With 
modern technology, however, anyone 
with the means and the inclination can 
maintain in a single computer file the 
equivalent of twenty single-spaced typed 
pages, enough for a complete dossier, 
on every man, woman and child in the 
United States, and can retrieve infor-
mation on any particular individual 
within thirty seconds.9 The government 
does not now operate such an informa-
tion system-not because it lacks the 
technology to do so, but because the 
idea of a centralized national data center 
so shocked the public's consciousness 
when Congress first considered the idea 
in the mid-1960's, that the proposal has 
never seriously been reconsidered. to 
Today, congressional approval of the 
idea is no longer necessary because 
computer matching programs are creat-
ing a de facto national data center. ll 
The computer files of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), the Social 
Security Administration and the Census 
Bureau already contain almost every-
thing there is to know about most 
American's finances, health and life-
styles. 12 Americans who regularly volun-
teer personal information about them-
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selves to government agencies are often 
unaware of the fact that the government 
uses this information for many purposes, 
some of which are unrelated to those 
for which the information was originally 
gathered. For example, the IRS has 
allowed the Selective Service System to 
use computerized taxpayer files to 
identify draft non-registrants. 13 Soon, 
the Social Security Administration will 
open its computer banks to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
to assist that agency in locating illegal 
aliens. 14 Hundreds of computer matches 
have already been conducted and more 
are contemplated every day.15 
Federal agencies also match their 
computer records with computerized 
records contammg personal informa-
tion about Americans procured from 
the private sector. The IRS has just 
purchased from commercial marketing 
firms computerized lists of American 
households containing market research 
proj ections of their estimated incomes.16 
In preliminary tests soon to be con-
ducted, the IRS will match computerized 
lists of two million income-producing 
households in Wisconsin, Indiana, 
Nevada and Brooklyn, N.Y. with IRS 
lists of residents of those areas who 
filed income tax returns for the year 
1982. Individuals whose names appear 
in the commercially prepared lists, but 
not in the IRS' lists, will be targeted for 
investigation. 17 
The linkage of computer data banks 
within the government and between the 
public and private sectors raises a 
number of questions: How can the 
public be sure that the personal data 
stored in government computer banks 
and used in computer matches is both 
current and accurate? Should govern-
ment agencies be allowed common 
access to personal information volun-
teered by individuals for purposes that 
are unrelated to the objectives of a 
proposed computer match? Can the 
public prevent abusive and coercive 
computer matches from occurring? 
Congress sought to resolve these and 
other questions when it passed the 
Privacy Act of 1974, which prohibits 
government agencies from disclosing 
personal data retrieved from systems of 
records without an individual's consent. 18 
Although the Privacy Act does not 
expressly mention computer matching, 
its prohibitions apply to agencies that 
disclose personal records for use in 
computer matching programs. 19 
ttRaw Hits" and Real People 
Federal and state agencies use com-
puter matching programs to detect 
fraud and abuse in government benefit 
programs. The process is ideally suited 
for this purpose because it allows 
administrators to rapidly compare data 
contained in separate computer files to 
identify inconsistencies or similarities 
that might otherwise escape notice. In 
1977, Joseph A. Califano Jr., then 
Secretary of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW), in-
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augurated one of the first computer 
matches, a program called "Project 
Match," designed to identify federal 
employees who were fraudulently ob-
taining welfare benefits. 20 
In the pilot program (a test-run for 
an eventual match of five million 
federal employee records with welfare 
records from twenty-six states21 ), Secre-
tary Califano matched HEW personnel 
files with welfare rolls provided by the 
District of Columbia. His goal was to 
identify "hits"22-individuals listed in 
both computer files. The initial match 
identified 638 hits, or 638 HEW 
employees who were also listed as 
welfare recipients. Gainfully employed 
people are generally ineligible for 
welfare benefits. These 638 employees 
were therefore automatically suspected 
of welfare fraud. The unscreened hits, 
or "raw hits," were targeted for 
preliminary investigation, after which 
480 (75%) were eliminated from 
further scrutiny for various reasons. 
The names of the remaining 158 
employees (the "solid hits") were 
forwarded to the Social Security Ad-
ministration Integrity Staff for further 
investigation.23 
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Eventually, fifteen welfare mothers 
employed by HEW were indicted. No 
one ever told these women prior to 
their indictments that their names 
appeared as "hits" in a computer 
match; hence, they had no opportunity 
to explain their circumstances before 
Secretary Califano freely released their 
names to the press.24 Of the fifteen 
indicted welfare mothers, five had their 
cases dismissed and four had the 
charges reduced to misdemeanors. The 
remaining six pled guilty and were 
sentenced to jail, but none had to serve 
prison time. For all of its efforts, HEW 
recovered less than $2,000. 25 
One woman whose case was dismissed 
was a former nursing student who 
accepted welfare after she found out 
that she had cervical cancer. After 
months of cobalt treatment, she decided 
to go back to work and found a job at 
HEW. She immediately told her social 
worker about her new job and was told 
not to worry if she received a few more 
welfare checks. When the checks kept 
coming, the woman could not resist the 
temptation to cash them to pay her 
mounting medical bills. Then Project 
Match identified her as a hit in its 
computer match. Soon after, the 
woman's friends called to tell her that 
her name was listed in the newspapers, 
as a welfare cheat. 
Following her indictment, the woman's 
court-appointed attorney advised her to 
plead guilty. Before accepting her plea, 
the trial judge asked her whether she had 
ever told her social worker about her 
job. When she replied that she had, the 
judge immediately dismissed her case. 26 
As this case and the following case 
illustrate, the identification of individuals 
as "hits" in computer matches often 
results in a presumption of their guilt, 
requiring individuals to prove their 
innocence. 
In August, 1982, the Massachusetts 
Department of Welfare conducted a 
computer match to identify welfare 
recipients who had cash assets in excess 
of allowable limits. The Department 
provided to 117 cooperating Massa-
chusetts banks copies of computer files 
containing social security numbers of 
all welfare recipients in the state. The 
banks were requested to electronically 
match these social security numbers 
against their customers' social security 
numbers and bank balances to deter-
mine who on the list of welfare 
recipients had bank account balances 
that exceeded allowable limits. The 
banks performed the match and after-
wards returned lists of "raw hits." 
Then, without conducting any prior 
investigation, the Department sent out 
termination notices to every welfare 
recipient listed and referred their names 
to the Bureau of Special Investigations 
for fraud inquiry.27 
One welfare recipient whose benefits 
were terminated was a resident of a 
nursing home whose bank account 
contained a certificate of deposit which 
she held in trust for a local funeral 
director to pay the expenses of her own 
funeral. 28 Another victim of this com-
puter match was a woman who 
maintained a joint bank account with 
her brother, who was in the army. 
Though her brother owned most of the 
money in the account and the account 
exceeded the allowable limit by only 
$276, the Department still terminated 
her benefits. The termination was 
especially disturbing because she pre-
viously told her social worker about the 
account, and her social worker "told 
her not to worry about it. "29 
The Massachusetts Department of 
Welfare gave these welfare recipients 
no opportunity to explain their particu-
lar situations, except at administrative 
appeal hearings at which recipients had 
the burden of proving that a mistake had 
been made. Additionally, the Depart-
ment failed to account for inaccuracies 
in the computer data, such as transposed 
social security numbers, that could have 
mistakenly identified innocent people 
as welfare cheats and caused the 
erroneous termination of their benefits. 
(A class action suit has been filed by 
terminated welfare recipients to challenge 
the state's conduct and is now pending 
in a Massachusetts federal court.30 ) 
Project Match and the Massachusetts 
welfare/bank computer match are just 
two of hundreds of computer matches 
currently in progress or contemplated 
by federal or state agencies. Both 
matches utilized personal data disclosed 
by individuals for purposes unrelated 
Although shared 
access to information 
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to the objectives of the matches and 
used this information without the 
individuals' consent. Proponents praise 
computer matching for streamlining 
government benefit programs and sav-
ing taxpayers money. Inspector General 
Richard F. Kusserow, of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 
calls computer matching a valuable 
"auditing technique" that can be used 
to "purify" a data base.3! 
Opponents of computer matching 
programs criticize them for subjecting 
innocent people to close government 
scrutiny of their personal records 
without any prior particularized suspi-
cion of wrongdoing. Privacy experts call 
computer matching a perversion of the 
presumption of innocence and a viola-
tion of the public's expectation of 
pri vacy in their personal records. 32 Yet, 
computer matching is virtually unregu-
lated. President Reagan zealously pro-
motes the use of computer matching 
programs and advocates expanding 
them.33 The OMB (headed by David 
Stockman, a Reagan appointee), has the 
authority to oversee and issue guidelines 
for computer matching programs, but 
disclaims authority to prevent proposed 
computer matches, even those that fail 
to meet minimum legal requirements.34 
The situation has prompted Professor 
David Linowes, former chairman of the 
Privacy Protection Study Commission 
that first recommended adoption of the 
Privacy Act, to call computer matching 
"the biggest threat to privacy today."35 
Creation Of A De Facto 
National Data Center 
The federal government first began 
computerizing its records soon after 
World War II, when the Bureau of the 
Census bought the first commercially 
available computer.36 Despite its head-
start into the computer age, government 
information systems are decentralized 
and notoriously inefficient.37 In the 
mid-1960's, the Bureau of the Budget 
(now the OMB) sought to improve 
efficiency by proposing the creation of 
a centralized National Data Center that 
"would maintain in a single computer 
all of the statistical data accumulated by 
scores of different federal agencies 
about everyone in the United States."38 
Some people thought this idea was 
"eminently logical,"39 but others feared 
that a national data center would lead to 
uncontrolled intelligence gathering and 
surveillance operations. 
The threat to personal privacy 
became hard to ignore once advocates 
of the Center admitted that some data 
would have to contain personal identi-
fiers. 4o Soon, Congressmen, newspapers, 
magazines, law reviews and popular 
books all strongly criticized the idea. 
Lacking public support, the National 
Data Center proposal died in Congress 
in 1965. A chief advocate of the 
proposal has since conceded that its 
failure to address privacy considerations 
was a "gigantic oversight."4! In 1969, 
privacy legislation was introduced into 
Congress, but it was not until after the 
Watergate scandals that Congress passed 
the Privacy Act of 1974. 
Like a national data center, computer 
matching affords immediate access by 
government agencies to vast quantities 
of personal information. Although 
shared access to information is an 
efficient use of resources, expediency 
must be balanced against important 
privacy considerations. Professor Arthur 
R. Miller, an authority on privacy 
issues, writes that "when an individual 
is deprived of control over the spigot 
that governs the flow of information 
pertaining to him, ... he becomes sub-
servient to those people and institutions 
that are able to manipulate it. "42 Thus, 
unregulated expansion of the govern-
ment's information gathering network 
could shift the balance of power out of 
the hands of the electorate and into the 
hands of the government, which is 
precisely the danger George Orwell 
warned of in his book, I984. 
There are also practical reasons why 
the government should not pry into the 
personal records of its citizens without 
their consent. If Americans cannot trust 
their government to respect their 
informational privacy, then Americans 
will no longer comply voluntarily with 
the government's requests for personal 
information. The collection of income 
taxes, for example, which relies almost 
entirely upon the public's voluntary 
disclosure of confidential financial 
information would be grossly under-
mined. Accordingly, both theoretical 
and practical reasons exist for support-
ing privacy protection legislation. 
HRecords" and HSystems of 
Records" Under The Privacy 
Act 
By 1974, federal agencies had amassed 
nearly three billion records on individuals 
and maintained as few as SOO and as 
many as 6,000 separate data banks.43 
Advances in computerized data systems 
and their effect upon personal privacy 
prompted Congress to enact the Privacy 
Act. The Legislative History contains 
the following references to computers: 
(2) the increasing use of computers 
and sophisticated information 
technology, while essential to the 
efficient operations of the govern-
ment, has greatly magnified the 
harm to individual privacy that 
can occur from any collection, 
maintenance, use or dissemination 
of personal information. 
(5) in order to protect the privacy 
of individuals identified in infor-
mation systems maintained by 
federal agencies, it is necessary and 
proper for the Congress to regulate 
the collection, maintenance, use 
and dissemination of information 
by such agencies.44 
Under the Act, individuals may gain 
access to their government files or to 
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information pertaining to them in the 
possession of a government agency and 
may correct information that is inac-
curate, irrelevant, untimely or incom-
plete.45 In addition, the Act establishes 
standards of conduct for the govern-
ment's collection, maintenance, use and 
disclosure of personal records.46 
The Act does not, however, apply to 
all information maintained by govern-
ment agencies. It only applies to those 
records maintained within a system of 
records. To qualify as a "record," 
information maintained by a govern-
ment agency must contain a personal 
identifier such as a person's name, 
social security number "or other 
identifying particular assigned the in-
dividual, such as a finger or voice print 
or a photograph."47 To qualify as a 
"system of records," the records must 
be "retrieved" by a personalidentifier.48 
The government's disclosure of infor-
mation that is neither a "record" nor 
contained within a "system of records" 
is unreviewable under the Act. 
The leading case interpreting the 
"system of records" definition is 
Smiertka v. Department of Treasury,49 in 
which the court held that the Privacy 
Act is inapplicable where the particular 
record disclosed was incapable of being 
retrieved by the plaintiff's personal 
identifier, even though it was retrievable 
by other reasonable means. Smiertka, a 
discharged IRS employee, sued the 
Department of the Treasury to obtain 
access under the Privacy Act to certain 
daily investigation reports. These re-
ports, prepared by IRS investigators as 
routine summaries of their work, 
contained references to the agency's 
investigation of Smiertka that led to his 
eventual discharge. The court upheld 
the agency's denial of access to these 
reports on the grounds that they were 
not indexed according to Smiertka's 
name or other personal identifier. The 
fact that they could be retrieved easily 
by the name of the investigator who 
wrote the reports was "wholly beside 
the point."50 
The holding in Smiertka was explained 
in Savarese v. U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, 51 in which the 
court reasoned that if it upheld a 
Privacy Act claim where the disclosure 
did not result from the retrieval of 
plaintiff's records from within a system 
of records, then 
no government employee could 
utter a single word concerning any 
person without first reviewing all 
systems of records within the 
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agency to determine whether or 
not the information in question 
was contained therein .... It borders 
on the absurd to contend that all 
officals should have a pansophic 
recall concerning every record 
within every system of records 
within the agency.sz 
Recent cases have followed this 
analysis. In one particularly troubling 
case, Olberdung v. U.S. Department of 
Defense,53 decided in June, 1983, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the lower court's dismissal of 
the plaintiff's Privacy Act claim on the 
grounds that the Army General who 
disclosed the plaintiff's psychiatric test 
results, without the plaintiff's consent, 
, recalled the information from his own 
memory and did not retrieve the 
information from a "system of records." 
The fact that the test results could have 
been retrieved from the Madigan Army 
As a threshold test 
for bringing agency 
conduct within the 
scope of the Privacy 
Act, the Usystem of 
records" definition is 
too narrow. 
Medical Center's system of records 
which indexed the records according to 
the plaintiff's name was held to be 
immaterial. 
This case illustrates the inadequacy 
of the "system of records" definition. 
The object of the Privacy Act is to 
protect the privacy of individuals. An 
unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information invades an individual's 
privacy regardless of the manner in 
which the information is retrieved. An 
individual whose psychiatric test results 
are disclosed without his prior consent 
suffers no less of a loss of privacy when 
these records are retrieved from a 
system of records, than when they are 
recollected from a bureaucrat's own 
memory. 
As a threshold test for bringing 
agency conduct within the scope of the 
Privacy Act, the "system of records" 
definition is too narrow. It freely 
exempts invasive disclosures on purely 
mechanical grounds. But assuming that 
an agency's recordkeeping has passed 
through this narrow hoop, its conduct 
may still escape Privacy Act scrutiny 
through the trapdoor of one of the 
Act's twelve exceptions.54 
One such exception is the "routine 
use" exception.55 The term "routine 
use" is defined as "the use of [a] record 
for a purpose which is compatible with 
the purpose for which it was collected" 
[emphasis added]. 56 Agencies are required 
to publish annual notices in the Federal 
Register describing each routine use of 
records contained within each system 
of records. This notice must indicate 
the purpose for each purported routine 
use and the categories of each user.57 
Privacy experts express grave concern 
over the breadth of~this exception and 
over the fact that the twelve exceptions 
have all but swallowed up the general 
rule that prohibits non-consensual 
disclosures of personal information. 58 
Moreover, the courts have not critically 
analyzed the application of this exception 
in particular circumstances. In Parks v. 
I.R.s.,59 for example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
an agency's non-consensual disclosure 
of the identities of employees who 
contributed to savings bond solicitations 
was not a "routine use" of agency 
information, not because the purported 
routine use failed to meet substantive 
definitional requirements, but rather 
because the agency failed to publish a 
notice in the Federal Register. Privacy 
experts wonder whether all an agency 
need do is publish Federal Register 
notices to qualify their disclosures of 
personal information under the "routine 
use" exception to escape Privacy Act 
compliance.6o John H. Shattuck, Na-
tional Legislative Director of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, is concerned 
that the test of "compatibility" under 
the "routine use" exception has become 
so elastic that it is now virtually 
ignored. In his prepared statement 
submitted to Rep. Glenn English's 
House subcommittee in June, 1983, 
Mr. Shattuck commented that "[i]n 
practice, 'routine use' has come to 
mean any use which an agency deems to 
be appropriate. So long as a 'notice of 
routine use' is published in the Federal 
Register, just about anything goes."61 
Computer Matching Under 
The Privacy Act 
The Privacy Act does not specifically 
mention computer matching, and as 
yet, there is no body of case law on the 
subject. If computer matches were 
subject to the Privacy Act, agencies 
would have to notify and obtain the 
prior written consent of all individuals 
whose computer records were involved 
in any computer matching program.62 
The time and expense involved would 
be prohibitive. In Project Match, for 
example, the data base of just one of the 
computer files involved in the match 
contained the records of two million 
individuals.63 Certainly, if computer 
matching did not fall within one of the 
exceptions to the Privacy Act, it would 
come to an abrupt halt. 
Proponents of computer matching do 
all they can to ensure that computer 
matching programs are exempt from 
Privacy Act disclosure requirements. In 
Computer Matching Guidelines pro-
mulgated by the OMB in 1975 and 
overhauled by the Reagan administration 
in 1982,64 agency disclosures of personal 
records to conduct computer matches 
is a permissible routine use of agency 
records.6s The OMB does not, however, 
enforce the substantive requirements to 
qualify disclosures under this exception. 
Lax enforcement troubles even those 
who advocate computer matching. 
In December, 1982, Thomas F. 
McBride, Associate Dean of Stanford 
Law School and Former Inspector 
General of the u.S. Department of 
Labor, testified before a Senate sub-
committee investigating computer 
matching programs and candidly ad-
mitted that 
I have always been somewhat 
baffled by what seems to me to be 
a somewhat illusory protection, 
the routine use clause of the 
Privacy Act. Basically, what those 
[agencies] conducting matches 
have done, those subject to the 
Privacy Act, is to publish notice 
and add the match as a routine use 
[of agency records], even though 
it did not seem to have a clear 
nexus to the purpose for which 
the data was originally collected .... 
I've often been puzzled as to 
whether there is some distortion 
of the intention of the legislation. 
Routine use has become pro 
forma. 66 
Six months later, Christopher DeMuth, 
OMB Administrator for Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, testified before 
Rep. English's House subcommittee 
and shocked Rep. English by revealing 
that the OMB essentially rubberstamps 
agencies' purported routine uses, thus 
confirming former Inspector General 
McBride's observations. When asked 
by Rep. English whether qualifying as a 
routine use had any substantive element 
apart from the procedural requirement 
of publishing Federal Register notices, 
Mr. DeMuth replied that 
[a]gencies come to us [OMB] and 
ask us about specific systems [of 
records] and how [their proposed 
routine use] fits within the law. 
They describe to us their programs 
and the nature of information and 
what kinds of uses were made of it 
in the past. We try to settle these 
things on a case-by-case basis. We 
do not have any authority to say yes 
or no as to a given routine use 
[emphasis added]. 67 
ttln practice, troutine 
use' has come to 
mean any use which 
an agency deems to 
be appropriate. So 
long as a tnotice of 
routine use' is 
published in the 
Federal Register, just 
about anything 
goes." 
Later in his testimony he added 
My understandings of the Privacy 
Act and OMB's regulatory 
authority under the act is that it 
does not give us the authority to 
tell an agency head or any agency's 
senior Privacy Act official that a 
certain use would not fit within 
the routine use definition of the 
act ... - to overrule the agency 
official administratively. Routine 
use determinations are given to 
the agency head ultimately under 
the act ... [ we] cannot deny routine 
uses [emphasis added]. 68 
If OMB, which is authorized to 
oversee implementation of the Privacy 
Act, is not effectively policing compli-
ance with its substantive requirements, 
then who is? The answer is, unfortunately, 
no one. Enforcement, such as it is, is left 
entirely up to the public. 
Recovery Under The Privacy 
Act 
To recover under the Act for an 
agency's unauthorized disclosure of 
personal information, whether in the 
course of computer matching or other-
wise, an individual must establish that: 
(1) the agency acted intentionally 
or willfully;69 
(2) he thereby sustained an "ad-
verse effect"; 70 and 
(3) he suffered an out-of-pocket 
loss. (Courts have limited re-
covery to out-of-pocket losses 
for physical injuries only; emo-
tional or mental injuries are 
non-compensable. 71) 
John Shattuck says that "short of 
proving that one has been mutilated by 
a government computer," this damage 
requirement is impossible to meet. 
Thus, plaintiffs who bring Privacy Act 
claims seldom recover damages. 72 
Apart from the difficulty of proving 
damages, the Act is unenforceable 
because it fails to provide injunctive 
relief for wrongful disclosure. In other 
words, an individual who wishes to 
challenge the Internal Revenue Service's 
disclosure of his tax return information 
to the Selective Service System for a 
computer match to identify draft non-
registrants can do nothing to prevent 
the computer match from occurring. 
His only remedy is to collect damages 
after the match has been conducted and 
after his privacy has been violated, and 
then, only if he can establish the three 
elements listed above. 
Recommendations For Privacy 
Act Reform 
To prevent further erosion of the 
privacy protections Congress sought to 
implement under the Privacy Act, 
Congress should: 
1. Pass H.R. 3743,73 which calls for 
the creation of an independent, non-
partisan, permanent Privacy Protection 
Commission to develop and coordinate 
privacy protection policies and oversee 
compliance with the Privacy Act. 
2. Limit and refine the definition of 
"routine use" to prohibit the govern-
ment's unauthorized use of personal 
information for any purpose that is 
inconsistent with the reasonable ex-
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pectations of individuals whom the 
government asks to disclose personal 
information. 
3. Provide Injunctive 
wrongful disclosures even 








4. Require that all agencies conducting 
computer matches publicly disclose (i) 
a costlbenefit analysis prior to the 
match, (ii) a description of all records 
to be compared in the match, and (iii) 
the basis for determining that the 
objectives of the match are compatible 
with the purposes for which the 
information was originally collected 
and the reasonable expectations of the 
parties from whom the information was 
collected. 
Conclusion 
Computer matching is a tool; it is not 
evil in itself. Like any tool, its potential 
for harm rests in the sound discretion 
Many bureaucrats 
believe that uonly 
those who have 
something to hide" 
care about 
safeguarding the 
privacy of their 
personal records. 
of its user. In enacting the Privacy Act, 
Congress sought to limit the govern-
ment's discretion in its use and 
handling of personal information. Un-
fortunately, as it is presently inter-
preted, the Act falls short of accom-
plishing this goal. 
Many bureaucrats believe that "only 
those who have something to hide" care 
about safeguarding the privacy of their 
personal records. 74 Proponents of com-
puter matching, many of whom share 
this view, have come to regard the 
Privacy Act as a regulatory inconven-
ience that stands in the way of fiscal 
efficiency. Administrators who disagree 
with the objectives of the Privacy Act 
have craftily devised ways of getting 
around it. Courts have altogether 
ignored the spirit of the Act and 
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enforce only its procedural require-
ments. If computer matching is per-
mitted to continue unchecked, the 
government will soon have at its 
disposal the resources of a national data 
center and the license to use personal 
information stored within its data 
banks as a means of political coercion. 
The increasing dilution of informa-
tional privacy protection in this country 
also has international implications that 
few people realize. Recently, the Coun-
cil of Europe sent a directive to the 
Reagan administration suggesting that 
transborder data flows may be inter-
rupted or "seriously restricted," unless 
the United States implements stronger 
privacy protection at the national level. 
The Reagan administration has responded 
by stating that "[ t ]he U.S. legal 
structure provides adequate safeguards 
[sic] protection of personal privacy."75 
Considering the total abdication by the 
OMB of its oversight authority under 
the Privacy Act and the concurrent 
pressure by the Reagan administration 
to expand computer matching of 
unrelated personal information, this 
statement is indefensible. If those in 
power consider current privacy protec-
tions to be "adequate," then George 
Orwell's predictions for 1984 are more 
accurate than we think. W 
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